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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
ANGELO GIRON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 960203-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to bz searched, ar^ the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effeces against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE POUND THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
ARREST. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT, THAT WITH RESPECT TO THE 
SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST EXCEPTION THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION APPORDS GREATER PROTECTION THAN THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION, IS UNFOUNDED. 
A. Tfre Rqgprfl SWPQgtg the Search frg Incident tQ Arrqgt. 
Defendant correctly notes that in Chimel v. California, 3 95 
U.S. 752 (1969), the "Supreme Court ruled that contemporaneous 
with arrest, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search 
the area which the arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon 
or evidentiary items, i.e., the area within the arrestee's 
"immediate control.1" Id. at 763. Appellee's Br. at 12. 
However, he mistakenly argues that the State made no showing that 
Officer Bench's search of defendant's car was either 
contemporaneous ("temporal proximity") or that following his 
arrest his car was within his immediate control ("spatial 
proximity"). Appellee's Br. at 12-13. To the contrary, the 
record describes a continuous flow of events, tightly 
circumscribed in time and space. 
Officer Bench caught sight of defendant on 300 North at 600 
West, turned his patrol car around and engaged his lights and 
siren. When defendant finally stopped at 400 North and 610 West, 
approximately one and one-half blocks from the point the officer 
first sighted him, Officer Bench immediately arrested and 
handcuffed defendant and placed him in the patrol car (R. 13 0, 
154-55). The officer's description of these events make it plain 
2 
that when defendant initially failed to respond to the siren and 
lights that the officer followed defendant to the point at which 
defendant finally stopped. It is obvious that Officer Bench 
would have drawn his patrol car close to defendant's car, 
especially since defendant had already fled and then eluded the 
officer earlier that evening. This close proximity is supported 
by Officer's Bench apparent mode of stopping vehicles by pulling 
up immediately behind the targeted vehicle, as he had done when 
he first encountered defendant earlier that evening (R. 125). 
See State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1246 (U~ah App.), cert, 
denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (search incident to arrest 
upheld where defendant held in patrol car in the same parking lot 
with the defendant's car). 
Similarly, the record shows that the search was 
contemporaneous with the arrest. Defendant suggests that 
"contemporaneous" refers to an immediate search following arrest. 
Appellee's Br. at 13. However, "contemporaneous" only means 
"occurring during the same period of time." Random House Compact 
Unabridged Dictionary (2nd ed. 1996). Moreover, defendant cites 
no authority stating that the arrest and incident arrest must be 
virtually simultaneous. Rather, in keeping with the spirit of 
New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981), in which the Supreme 
Court relieved officers of the requirement to make "hairline 
distinctions" in effecting a search incident to arrest, see id. 
at 458 (citation omitted), courts have upheld searches preceded 
by a brief intervening act. £££, United States v. Willis. 37 F.3d 
313, (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding search incident to arrest where 
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police officer first looked in his patrol car for camera to take 
photographs); United States v. Harris. 617 A.2d 189, 193 (D.C. 
App. 1992) (upholding search incident to arrest preceded by 
reading the defendant his rights, searching him, and performing a 
check to determine ownership of the car); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search & Seizure § 7.1(c) (3rd ed. 1996) ("the fact that in 
almost all cases the search will be undertaken at the place of 
arrest is, as a practical matter, likely to overcome any problems 
as to temporal proximity"). 
After placing defendant in the patrol car, Officer Bench 
checked defendant's registration (R. 155). The record indicates 
that immediately afterward Officer Bench searched defendant's car 
(R. 11-12). 
What defendant seems to suggest, by claiming inadequate 
"time" or "spatial" proximity between his arrest and the 
challenged search, is that the State must prove more than the 
routine facts demonstrated in this case in order to justify the 
search of his automobile. But the Belton "search incident to 
arrest" cases do not turn upon anything more detailed than a 
routine, continuous sequence of events and normal physical 
proximity between the arrestee and the searched area. No 
stopwatch and tape measure-based evidence was recited to justify 
the searches, for example, in Belton and Moreno. Indeed, despite 
the oft-repeated assertion that search cases are "highly fact 
intensive," e.g.. State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah App. 
1990), rert. denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), Belton was written 
to eliminate excessively detail-focused analysis from the "search 
4 
incident to arrest'1 rule, and to institute a more 
"straightforward" rule, providing more consistent results. See 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60; State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994) 'appellate court has duty to "say what the law is and 
to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction"); State 
v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (appellate review 
fosters consistent "courtroom to courtroom" results); accord 
Ornelas v. United States. 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662-63 (1996). The 
trial court's suppression order, inconsistent with the Belton 
case line, gave rise to an inconsistent, legally unsupportable 
result in this case. 
Defendant also argues that the search-incident to arrest 
exception requires a showing of a threat to officer safety. 
Appellee's Br. at 14-16. In so arguing, defendant again 
disregards the essence of Belton's bright-line rule, allowing a 
search incident to a custodial arrest and relieving the officer 
of the need to make a judgment about whether the search is 
otherwise justified. Belton. 453 U.S. at 458-61: 
"The authority to search the person incident to a 
lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to 
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on 
what a court may later decide was the probability in a 
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence 
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. 
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause 
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; 
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to 
arrest requires no additional justification." 
IsL. at 461 (quoting United States v, Robinson, 414 u.s. 218, 235 
(1973)). £££ also State in re K.K.C 636 p.2d 1044, 1045-46 
(Utah 1981) (per curiam) (upholding search incident to arrest of 
5 
juveniles upon viewing open beer bottles and a "roach" clip); 
Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1246-49 (upholding search incident to arrest 
where no showing of danger to officers); United States v. Pino. 
855 F.2d 357, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1988), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 
1090, 110 S. Ct. 1160 (1990) (upholding search incident to arrest 
for traffic violation where no showing of danger to officers). 
Utah cases cited by defendant,1 see Appellee's Br. at 15-16, 
partly justify searches incident to arrest by noting demonstrable 
danger to officers, but they do not require such showing. 
Rather, they merely support Chimel's and Belton's underlying 
rationale for search incident to arrest, to wit: the possibility 
that weapons may be reached or evidence destroyed. 
In any case, there was ample evidence justifying Officer 
Bench's concern for his safety. Currently assigned to the Metro 
Gang Task Force, Officer Bench was patrolling an area known for 
heavy drug and gang activity when he twice stopped defendant (R. 
124, 143). From his earlier encounter with defendant, the 
officer knew that defendant (1) kept company with at least one 
person who would attempt to conceal suspected controlled 
substances and who would run from police and be assisted by 
surrounding residents in a fight with a police officer and (2) 
that defendant would himself flee in spite of an officer's 
specific instruction to remain in his place (R. 127-28). When 
1
 State v. Kent. 665 P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah 1983) (noting 
that the presence of a shotgun and other suspects loose in an 
area where shots were being fired presented an obvious threat to 
safety); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 785 (Utah App. 1991) 
(noting a separate safety concern in warrantless search of diaper 
bag for murder weapon). 
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the officer stopped defendant the second time, defendant was 
again with a strange male companion (R. 130). Under these 
circumstances any officer would feel concern for his safety. 
B. The State Constitution Provides No Greater Protection 
Than th« United States Constitution* 
Citing various cases in which members of the Utah Supreme 
Court have sought to clarify the automobile warrant exception to 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, defendant 
argues that under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
there can be no warrantless search of an automobile without 
probable cause and exigent circumstances.2 Therefore, he argues, 
because there was no showing of probable cause to search his car, 
his state constitutional rights were violated when Officer Bench 
searched his car incident to arrest without a warrant. 
Appellee's Br. at 17-20. 
This Court should decline to review defendant's claim 
because it was not adequately developed in the trial court. 
"Mere allusion to state constitutional claims, unsupported by 
2
 Defendant particularly relies on State v. Larocco. 794 
P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990) (automobile exception under state 
constitution requires "traditional justification, namely to 
protect safety of police or the public or to prevent the 
destruction of evidence," and a showing of probable cause and 
exigent circumstances); State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (finding no basis under the 
state constitution for a warrantless search "[o]nee the threat 
that the suspect will injure the officers with concealed weapons 
or will destroy evidence is gone"); State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 
1229, 1239 (Utah 1996) (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring in result) 
("I must point out that the lead opinion's directive to Utah 
courts to construe article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
in a manner similar to constructions of the Fourth Amendment 
except in compelling circumstances is not supported by a majority 
of this court and is not Utah law"). 
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meaningful analysis, does not permit appellate review." State v. 
Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Spuraeon. 
904 P.2d 220, 224 n.2 (Utah App. 1995) ("the proper forum in 
which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state 
constitutional interpretation is before the trial court") (citing 
State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990)). Defendant 
made no mention of a separate state constitutional analysis in 
either his motion to suppress or supporting memorandum (R. 45-46, 
53-61). At the suppression hearing, defendant inaccurately 
indicated to the court that there existed a difference between 
the Utah and United States Supreme Courts on the scope of search 
incident to arrest, simply referring to Justice Zimmerman's 
concurring opinion in Hygh and to Larocco. and asked, without any 
legal analysis, that the two constitutions be applied differently 
(R. 196-97). Such nominal allusion to a state constitutional 
argument fails to preserve it for appeal. However, even on the 
merits, defendant's claims are without merit. 
Contrary to defendant's argument, the Utah Supreme Court has 
failed to reach a consensus on the reach of article I, section 
14, as distinguished from the Fourth Amendment. Noting that, 
that Larocco was only a plurality opinion, this Court noted: 
The precedential value of the Larocco rationale is 
somewhat unclear . . . because Justice Durham's 
reasoning was joined only by Justice Zimmerman. 
Justice Stewart concurred in the result, but provided 
no insight into his rationale. Because he concurred 
only in the result, and because Justice Durham arrived 
at the result by using state constitutional analysis, 
it is possible that Justice Stewart arrived at his 
conclusion strictly through a Fourth Amendment 
approach. 
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State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 985 n.2 (Utah App. 1992). In 
fact, Justice Stewart has subsequently stated that his 
concurrence in Larocco. did not signal his acceptance of Justice 
Durham's state constitutional analysis. State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 
531, 536 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, J., concurring). More recently, 
the plurality in Anderson observed that *[the defendant's] 
reliance on rLaroccol should be tempered by its plurality 
status." Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1234-35 n.5. "The plurality 
opinion in Larocco represents the views of only two justices of 
this court and is therefore not the law of this state." Id. 
(citing Sims v, State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 15 (Utah 1992) 
(Stewart, J., concurring in the result)). 
Furthermore, the application of article I, section 14 beyond 
its federal counterpart has proceeded only issue-by-issue. See 
e.g.. State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah 1991) (having 
recognized a distinct state constitutional analysis in other 
contexts, uleav[ing] for another day the issue of whether to 
apply in appropriate circumstances a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule to article I, action 14 of the Utah 
Constitution"). Defendant cites no Utah case applying a distinct 
state constitutional analysis to the search incider.r. to arrest 
exception, and the State has been unable to locate any. 
Additionally, Chief Justice Zimmerman, along with Justice 
Durham, whose state constitutional views defendant particularly 
urges, has not categorically required that searches incident to 
arrest fall within the usual requirements to the warrant 
exception, namely a showing of probable cause and exigent 
9 
circumstances: "Warrantless searches would be permitted only 
where they satisfy their traditional justification--to protect 
the safety of officers or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence." Hyah. 711 P.2d at 272 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) 
(citing £]iiiii£l, 395 U.S. at 762-63) ) . fiaa alafi Larocco. 794 P.2d 
at 469-70 (Justice Durham quoting Justice Zimmerman's remarks 
from Hyah, above). 
Common sense supports distinguishing the search incident to 
arrest rationale from other warrantless searches which must be 
justified by evidence supporting probable cause. Police officers 
will frequently make valid arrests in circumstances in which they 
reasonably fear for their safety, but which do not support 
probable cause to search for weapons. See Strickling, 844 P.2d 
at 982-84 (justifying weapons search, without any prior basis for 
arrest, on the "prudent man" standard, citing Terry v. Ohio. 3 92 
U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). Obviously, the Utah Supreme Court did not 
intend to place police officers at frequent risk in the course of 
developing the scope of article I, section 14.3 Further, 
the State's reference to the weapons exception is not intended as 
a concession that the search incident to arrest exception 
requires any showing of actual threat to officer safety, but 
rather that a showing of probable cause as to danger is a totally 
3
 Cases cited by defendant requiring probable cause under 
the state constitution to justify a warrantless automobile search 
neither discussed nor comprehended the search-incident-to-arrest 
scenario. £££. Sims v. State Tax Comm'n. 841 P.2d 6, 8-9 (Utah 
1992) (invalidating suspicionless roadblock search); State v. 
Morck. 821 P.2d 1190, 1192-93 (Utah App. 1991) (warrantless 
search of truck for rifles used for poaching upheld on probable 
cause based on informant's tip and officers' observations). 
10 
unwarranted reading of the cases. As noted above, no Utah 
Supreme Court case has required a showing of danger to officers 
before permitting a search incident to arrest. 
Finally, departures from analogous federal constitutional 
law may be appropriate when federal doctrine on a legal point has 
become inconsistent and unworkable. See Hygh. 711 P.2d at 271-72 
(Zimmerman, J,, concurring); State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 
n.3 (Utah App. 1993). However, with respect to the scope of a 
search incident to arrest, federal under Belton is consistent. 
Further, Utah courts have followed Belton since it was issued in 
1981. £££ K.K.C. . 636 P.2d at 1046; Moreno. 910 P.2d at 1247-
48, 1249. It would be inappropriate to impose stricter limits on 
searches incident to arrest under the Utah Constitution. Such a 
ruling would contradict fifteen years of unbroken precedent, and 
would create, rather than correct, inconsistency and confusion in 
search and seizure law. See Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1235. 
The State's "search incident to arrest" argument was 
properly presented in the trial court, and is in full accord with 
settled law. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's order suppressing the evidence seized from defendant's 
car, and the order should be dismissed.4 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in Point I of this brief, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's ruling, and hold that the search of 
4
 The State relies on its opening brief with respect to 
defendant's responses supporting the tria-L court's order as to 
impoundment and inventory search of defendant's car. 
11 
defendant's car was proper incident to his arrest. 
Alternatively, reversal is also supported for the reasons 
explained in Points II and III of the State's opening brief. 
Contraband was lawfully seized from defendant's car, and 
therefore is admissible at his trial. The trial court's 
suppression order and its order of dismissal should be reversed 
and this matter remanded to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2-r day of February, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
/ KENNETH BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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